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Does the Concept of “Altered States of Consciousness”
Rest on a Mistake?
Adam J. Rock
Deakin University
Melbourne, VIC, Australia

Stanley Krippner1

Saybrook Graduate School
San Francisco, CA, USA
Block (2002) has argued that the multiplicity of meanings ascribed to consciousness is due
to the erroneous treatment of very different concepts as a single concept. Block distinguished
four notions of consciousness intended to encapsulate the various meanings attributed to
the term: phenomenal, access, self, and monitoring consciousness. We argue that what is
common to all of these definitions is the implicit distinction between consciousness and the
content of consciousness. We critically examine the term “altered state of consciousness”
and argue that affixing the qualifier “altered state” to consciousness results in a theoretical
confusion of consciousness and its content, that is, consciousness is mistaken for the content of consciousness. We refer to this as the consciousness/content fallacy and argue that
it may be avoided if one supplants “altered states of consciousness” with “altered pattern of
phenomenal properties,” an extrapolation of the term “phenomenal field.” Implications of
the consciousness/content fallacy for theory and research are also considered.

C

halmers (1995) suggested that, “There is nothing
we know more intimately than consciousness,
but there is nothing harder to explain” (p. 200).
Although psychologists and philosophers of mind are
engaged in intricate debate over the concept of “consciousness” (e.g., Antony, 2002; Block, 1995; Chalmers,
1996, 2002; Lormand, 1996; Natsoulas, 1978, 1983;
Rosenthal, 2002; Silby, 1998), there exists a lacuna in
the literature with regards to a critical analysis of the
distinction between consciousness and the content of
consciousness inherent in definitions of the term consciousness and the intimately-related so-called “state”
of consciousness. Similarly, scholars have neglected to
delineate the kind of fallacious reasoning whereby a
shift from the key definitional elements of the term consciousness to states of consciousness is accompanied by
a theoretical confusion of consciousness and the content
of consciousness. We refer to this as the consciousness/
content fallacy.
The purpose of this paper is to elucidate the
aforementioned fallacy and provide an attempt at resolution. We proceed by reviewing numerous definitions of

consciousness and argue that they all exemplify a commonality with regards to the implicit distinction between
consciousness and the content of consciousness. Secondly,
the consciousness/content fallacy is explicated through an
analysis of the concept of states of consciousness. Finally,
the consciousness/content fallacy is examined with
reference to the concept of “altered states of consciousness”
and, subsequently, a solution to the fallacy is proposed.
It is noteworthy that there exist instances in
which the key definitional elements of the term consciousness are held to be conscious awareness and unconscious functioning (Krippner, 1972) or simply conscious
awareness, attention, and memory (Farthing, 1992). The
present paper, however, is concerned with the concept of
consciousness as the “cognizor” of objects (e.g., internal
and external events) and the fallacy that occurs when
a shift from the term consciousness to states of consciousness is accompanied by a confusion of consciousness with the content of consciousness. Consequently,
for the purpose of the present paper, only the conscious
awareness component of the concept of consciousness
will be considered.
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Consciousness and Content
Forman (1996) stated that the inherent difficulty
associated with providing an adequate definition of consciousness is due in part to the multiplicity of meanings
ascribed to the term. Block (2002) suggested that this multiplicity of meanings is due to the erroneous treatment of
very different concepts as a single concept. For example,
in an influential series of articles Block (e.g., 1995, 2002)
distinguished a number of notions of consciousness: phenomenal, access, self, and monitoring consciousness.
Block (2002, p. 206) stated that phenomenal
consciousness (p-consciousness) refers to one being aware
of “experiential properties of sensations, feelings and perceptions...thoughts, wants and emotions.” In contrast,
access-consciousness (a-consciousness) is a non-phenomenal notion of consciousness. An entity exemplifying aconsciousness is one who is aware of information “poised
for direct rational control of action” (Silby, 1998, p. 3).
Block (2002) suggested that self-consciousness (s-consciousness) is illustrated by “me-ishness.” An s-conscious
entity is one that is aware of the concept of the self and
that one’s usage of this concept (explicitly or implicitly)
in thinking about oneself also reveals s-consciousness.
Consciousness may also be conceptualized as an internal
monitor, that is, monitoring consciousness (m-consciousness). Block suggested that an entity may be m-conscious
of inner perceptions, internal scanning, and metacognitive thoughts resulting in entering a particular cognitive
state.
A commonality exemplified by the preceding
notions of consciousness is that, “When people are
conscious, they are always conscious of something.
Consciousness always has an object” (Benjafield, 1992,
p. 58).2 For example, one may be p-conscious of phenomenal properties, a-conscious of information that
may be invoked to control actions, s-conscious of one’s
self-concept, or m-conscious of, for example, internal
scanning. Benjafield’s contention is by no means novel.
Indeed, over a century ago Husserl argued that, “All
consciousness…is consciousness of something” (cited in
Sartre, 1958, p. Ii). Similarly, Sartre himself asserted that
consciousness always attends to a “transcendent object”
and is thereby precluded from being phenomenologically
contentless (p. 629). Sartre referred to this type of consciousness as “positional self-consciousness.” Sartre stated
that:

34

all my judgments or practical activities, all my present
inclinations transcend themselves; they aim at the
table and are absorbed in it. Not all consciousness
is knowledge (there are states of affective consciousness, for example), but all knowing consciousness
can be knowledge only of its object. (p. Iii)
A survey of the cognitive psychology literature
further supports Benjafield’s (1992) contention. In brief,
cognitive psychologists (e.g., Matlin, 1998; Nairne, 1997;
Solso, 2001) tend to define consciousness as the awareness
of internal and external events (e.g., mental phenomena
and stimuli in the environment, respectively). In contrast,
others limit the definitional boundary of consciousness to “the subjective awareness of mental events” (e.g.,
Westen, 1999, p. G-4). It is arguable that these assertions
constitute the core of consciousness concepts in cognitive
psychology today. Commenting on the definition of
consciousness as being aware of something, Natsoulas
(1978) wrote: “It is arguably our most basic concept of
consciousness, for it is implicated in all the other senses”
(p. 910).
The salient point exemplified by the preceding
descriptions of consciousness is the distinction between
consciousness and the content of consciousness. For
example, Block’s (2002) phenomenal consciousness is
not composed of experiential properties such as sensations and perceptions (contents of p-consciousness), but
rather refers to one being p-conscious of experiential properties such as sensations and perceptions.

All that there is of intention in my actual consciousness is directed toward the outside, toward the table;

Confusing Consciousness and Content
As stated above, consciousness is often defined
as awareness of internal and external events (e.g., Matlin,
1998; Nairne, 1997; Solso, 2001) or merely awareness of
something (e.g., Natsoulas, 1978). In contrast, a so-called
state of consciousness (SoC) tends to be defined as “[the
set] of mental episodes of which one can readily become
directly aware” (p. 912). While definitions of consciousness typically distinguish consciousness from the content
of consciousness, the preceding definition of SoCs represents a theoretical confusion of consciousness and its
contents by explicitly stating that a SoC is the content
(i.e., mental episodes) available to conscious awareness.
That is, when the qualifier “state” is affixed to consciousness, “it” [consciousness] is held to be content. Consequently, the term states of consciousness rests on a conflation of consciousness and content whereby consciousness
is erroneously categorized in terms of content rendered
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perceptible, presumably, by itself. Again, we refer to this
as the consciousness/content fallacy.
Implicit in the consciousness/content fallacy is
the fallacious notion that during a SoC, consciousness
may observe its own qualities. For example, a privileged observer would only be conscious of the fact that
he or she was experiencing a particular SoC (i.e., that
consciousness exemplified state-like properties), if consciousness could observe its own properties. However,
one cannot directly experience the conscious awareness
process, CA1, which functions to render an object perceptible because this would require the postulation of a
second conscious awareness process, CA2, necessary to
render CA1 a perceptible object, thus, committing one
to a vicious regress.
Furthermore, others (e.g., Feinberg, 2001; Kant,
1781/1933; Vasu, 1979) have argued that consciousness
cannot directly experience “itself” as a perceptible object,
for then it would cease to be the subject.3 Wilber (1993)
stated that the circumstance is analogous to a sword that
cannot cut itself, an eye that cannot see itself, a tongue
that cannot taste itself, or a finger that cannot touch its
own tip. This argument has been reiterated in Baladeva’s
commentary to the Vedanta sutras of Badarayana in which
he wrote, “If the Self could perceive His own properties,
He could also perceive Himself; which is absurd, since
one and the same thing cannot be both the agent and the
object of an action” (Vasu, 1979, p. 331). Similarly, in the
Brihadaranyaka-Upanishad it is stated that, “You cannot
see the seer of sight, you cannot hear the hearer of sound,
you cannot think the thinker of the thought, you cannot
know the knower of the known” (Swami & Yeats, 1970,
p. 138). As Kant (1781/1933) argued:
I cannot know as an object that which I must presuppose in order to know any object, and that the determining self (the thought) is distinguished from the
self that is to be determined (the thinking subject) in
the same way that knowledge is distinguished from
its object. (p. 365)

rather than committing the consciousness/content fallacy
via a movement from a definition of consciousness to a
definition of SoCs, Pekala has implicitly conflated consciousness and content within the context of a single
definition.
The Consciousness/Content Fallacy with Reference
to Altered States of Consciousness
During the formative stages of humanistic and
transpersonal psychology, Ludwig (1969), Krippner
(1972), and Tart (1969) made contributions regarding
the formulation of operational definitions pertaining
to the concept of altered states of consciousness (ASCs).
Decades later such definitions are still held by many to
constitute the standard.
Ludwig (1969) defined an ASC as
any mental state(s), induced by various physiological,
psychological, or pharmacological manoeuvres or
agents, which can be recognized subjectively by the
individual himself (or by an objective observer of the
individual) as representing a sufficient deviation in
subjective experience or psychological functioning
from certain general norms for that individual during
alert, waking consciousness. (pp. 9-10)
Unfortunately, Ludwig’s definition fails to clarify
precisely what constitutes a “sufficient deviation in subjective experience” (pp. 9-10). Furthermore, the “general
norms” held to be associated with normal waking consciousness are neither outlined nor explained.
In contrast to Ludwig (1969), Krippner (1972)
has formulated a definition of ASCs that circumvents the
problems associated with operationalizing the qualifying
term “sufficient.” Krippner (1972) defined an ASC as
a mental state which can be subjectively recognized
by an individual (or by an objective observer of the
individual) as representing a difference in psychological functioning from the individual’s ‘normal’ alert
state. (p. 1)

A variant of the consciousness/content fallacy
may be found in Pekala’s (1991) statement that, “By
consciousness I mean one’s awareness of one’s subjective experience, including both the processes of being
aware and the various contents of the awareness” (p.
1). That is, Pekala contended that consciousness is both
“one’s awareness of one’s subjective experience” and “the
various contents of the awareness” (p. 1). Consequently,

Correspondingly, Tart (1969) defined an ASC for a given
individual as one in which the person experiences a
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qualitative shift in his pattern of mental functioning,
that is, he feels not just a quantitative shift (more
or less alert, more or less visual imagery, sharper or
duller, etc.), but also that some quality or qualities of
his mental processes are different. (p. 1)

Examples of qualities may include visual hallucinations,
alterations in space-time perception, reductions in discursive thought, and the dissolution of one’s sense of
self, and it can be argued that Tart’s (1969) decision to
include both quantitative and qualitative differences in
cognitive functioning within the definitional boundaries
of ASCs renders his formulation of the concept superior
to Krippner’s (1972) attempt at operationalization.
It is noteworthy that the preceding definitions
postulate that it is the shifts, deviations, or differences
in subjective experience (Ludwig, 1969), psychological
functioning (Krippner, 1972), or mental functioning
(Tart, 1969) that constitute an ASC. If one accepts the
definition of an ASC as shifts, deviations, or differences
in subjective experience, psychological functioning, or
mental functioning, then it would seem to follow that
ordinary consciousness is the baseline subjective experience, psychological functioning, or mental functioning.
Furthermore, if an ASC did constitute the shifts, deviations, or differences in subjective experience, psychological functioning, or mental functioning, then a privileged
observer would not be conscious of such shifts on the
grounds that to be conscious of such shifts would necessitate that consciousness could observe changes in its own
properties, that is, alterations held to constitute an ASC.
Ludwig (1969), Krippner (1972), and Tart (1969) nonetheless emphasize that an ASC may be subjectively recognized by a privileged observer. Consequently, if these
authors are using ASC as a subsidiary part of the notion of
consciousness as one being conscious of something (e.g.,
an internal or external event), then they have confused
consciousness and the content of consciousness on the
grounds that consciousness is implicitly held to be both:
(1) the cognizor of shifts in subjective experience, and (2)
the shifts in subjective experience. If ASC is not being
used as a subsidiary part of the aforementioned notion of
consciousness, then the definition of consciousness that
has been used to extrapolate a definition for ASC needs
to be explicitly stated.
If one accepts the definition of consciousness
as being conscious of something, then it would seem to
follow that during an ASC it is the phenomenal properties that consciousness may be aware of that are altered
(e.g., visual mental imagery, body image, time sense),
rather than the state of consciousness. It is arguable,
however, that phenomenal properties do not encapsulate
the variety of mental phenomena that may be objectified
by consciousness. For example, as previously discussed,
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Block (2002) formulated the notion of access-consciousness whereby an entity is held to be conscious of nonphenomenal mental objects: information primed for the
rational control of one’s actions (Silby, 1998). Similarly,
O’Brien and Opie (1997) suggested that “phenomenal
experience” does not refer to objects associated with selfconsciousness and access-consciousness (e.g., self-concept
and information that may be invoked to control actions,
respectively), but rather the “what is it like?” of experience (p. 269). For the purpose of this paper, however,
Reber and Reber’s (2001) definition of phenomenal field
as “absolutely anything that is in the total momentary
experiencing of a person, including the experience of the
self” (p. 532) is adopted and applied to “phenomenal
properties.” It is arguable that if one defines phenomenal
properties in this way, then an altered pattern of phenomenal properties encapsulates what has been referred
to by Block (1995) and others (e.g., Lormand, 1996) as
phenomenal and non-phenomenal objects of conscious
awareness, that is, the content that a privileged observer
may be aware of during what Krippner (1972), Ludwig
(1969), and Tart (1969) referred to as an ASC.4 One
may then recommend that the term altered state of consciousness be supplanted by a new term, “altered pattern
of phenomenal properties.”5, 6 It would seem that by
reconceptualizing the notion of an ASC in this manner,
the confusion of consciousness with the content of consciousness is avoided.7
The wide applicability of our proposed solution
to the consciousness/content fallacy may be exemplified
with respect to shamanic research. While the key definitional elements of the term “shamanic states of consciousness” are somewhat contentious, it is generally held that
an integral feature of such states is the presence of highly
organized, multi-modal (e.g., visual, auditory, gustatory,
tactile) mental imagery that is consistent with a shamanic
cosmology (e.g., Houran, Lange & Crist-Houran, 1997;
Noll, 1983, 1985; Walsh, 1995). For instance, as an experimental participant’s shamanic journey to the “lower
world” progresses, extraneous visual mental images (i.e.,
distracting thoughts) may be supplanted by visual mental
images of, for example, anthropomorphous spirit helpers,
rivers, and predatory creatures. It is the qualitative alteration of visual mental images, rather than consciousness
“itself,” that contributes to a privileged observer’s (i.e.,
an experimental participant) subjective recognition that
a particular state is shamanic. Consequently, it would
seem more appropriate to speak of shamanic patterns of
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phenomenal properties rather than a shamanic state of
consciousness.
Conclusion
This paper reviews numerous definitions of
the term consciousness and argues that they all share
the implicit distinction between consciousness and the
content of consciousness. It is further suggested that
definitions of the terms states of consciousness and
altered states of consciousness erroneously conflate consciousness and content by explicitly defining SoCs as
the content (i.e., mental episodes) available to conscious
awareness. That is, when the qualifier “state” is affixed to
consciousness, “it” [consciousness] is held to be content.
This is referred to as the consciousness/content fallacy. It
is also contended that the consciousness/content fallacy
is avoided if one reconceptualizes an ASC as an altered
pattern of phenomenal properties. Finally, the wide applicability of our proposed solution to the consciousness/
content fallacy is illustrated with respect to shamanic
research.
The consciousness/content fallacy has numerous
theoretical implications. Theories of ASCs, for example,
would be enhanced by supplanting the term altered
states of consciousness with altered patterns of phenomenal properties. Theories containing the consciousness/content fallacy would need to be revised to avoid
fallacious contentions such as consciousness is simultaneously: (1) the cognizor of shifts in, for instance, subjective experience, and (2) the shifts in subjective experience themselves. If a particular ASC theory did not
incorporate the term altered states of consciousness as a
subsidiary of the concept of consciousness as conscious
awareness of something, then this would need to be
explicitly stated. Fundamentally, ASC theories would
need to be reformulated such that the phenomenon being
explained is alterations in phenomenal properties rather
than consciousness.
In addition, the consciousness/content fallacy
has implications for quantitative and qualitative
research. A researcher who is cognizant of this fallacy
and wishes to develop a survey instrument to quantitatively measure, for example, meditation experiences,
would construct items pertaining to alterations in
phenomenal properties, rather than alterations in consciousness.8 For instance, items such as “I experienced
an extremely unusual state of consciousness” would be
omitted in favor of items addressing a range of phenom-
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enal properties (e.g., “My subjective time sense seemed
to slow down,” “My visual imagery became extremely
vivid,” “I felt great joy”). Similarly, consider a research
situation in which, for example, an existential-phenomenological study of shamanic journeying experiences
is conducted using semi-structured interviews for the
purpose of obtaining non-numerical data that may be
organized into comprehensive constituent themes. A
researcher who is mindful of the consciousness/content
fallacy would not pose open-ended questions about
shamanic states of consciousness or alterations in consciousness. Instead open-ended questions pertaining to
phenomenal properties would be asked (e.g., “Can you
please tell me about the visual mental images that you
encountered during your last journeying experience?”).
We hope that this elucidation and proposed resolution
of the consciousness/content fallacy will encourage consciousness theoreticians and researchers from diverse
backgrounds to address its implications.
Endnotes
1. The authors wish to thank the Chair for the Study of
Consciousness, Saybrook Graduate School and Research
Center, for its support of this paper.
2. One notable exception is an unmediated form of mystical
experience referred to as the pure consciousness event
(PCE) (e.g., Almond, 1982; Bucknell, 1989a; Franklin,
1990; Kessler & Prigge, 1982; Matt, 1990; Perovich, 1990;
Prigge & Kessler, 1990; Rothberg, 1990; Woodhouse,
1990). Forman (1990a) defined the PCE as “a wakeful
though contentless (nonintentional) consciousness” (p.
8). A substantial body of evidence has been produced to
support this claim. For example, Chapple (1990) reported
that descriptions of kaivalyam in the Samkhya system and
samadhi in the Yoga Sutras are suggestive of the “attainment
of a purified consciousness that is beyond characterization”
(p. 70). Griffiths (1990) surveyed the Indian Buddhist
tradition and found evidence for a condition referred to
as the attainment of cessation (nirodhasamapatti), which
is defined as “the non-occurrence of mind and mental
concomitants” (p. 78). Bucknell (1989b) suggested that
the “third non-material jhana” encountered in Buddhist
meditation is analogous to the introvertive mystical experience “in which both the thought-stream and sensory input
have ceased, leaving zero mental content” (p. 19). Forman
(1990b) examined the mystical theology of the Christian
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mystic Meister Eckhart and concluded that Eckhart considered encounters with the Godhead to be “phenomenologically contentless” (p. 112).
3. For the purpose of the present paper, consciousness is not
considered a subject in the literal sense of a thing that
attends to objects, but rather a process of subjectivity
that renders objects perceptible.
4. It is not uncommon for scholars to use the term “phenomenal” or “phenomenological” to denote objects that,
for example, Block (1995) would categorize as non-phenomenal. For example, Pekala’s (1991) use of the term
“phenomenological experience” includes phenomena that
Block would consider associated with self-consciousness
(e.g., one’s self as an object of consciousness).
5. It is arguable that because we are delimiting our consideration of the concept of consciousness to the conscious
awareness component of consciousness, the term altered
pattern of phenomenal properties should be qualified and
replaced with conscious awareness of an altered pattern of
phenomenal properties. However, the qualifier conscious
awareness is superfluous because it is implicit in the key
definitional elements of the term “phenomenal” as derived
from the term “phenomenal field” (i.e., “absolutely
anything that is in the total momentary experiencing of
a person, including the experience of the self ” (Reber &
Reber, 2001, p. 532). Specifically, it may be argued that
this “total momentary experiencing of a person” (p. 532)
implies conscious awareness.
6. A pattern of phenomenal properties is held to be altered
relative to a baseline pattern of phenomenal properties,
that is, what is traditionally referred to as normal waking
consciousness or an ordinary waking state. One may use,
for example, a retrospective phenomenological assessment
instrument referred to as the Phenomenology of Consciousness Inventory (PCI; Pekala, 1991) to investigate
patterns of phenomenal properties. In fact, the PCI is held
to quantify “both the major contents of consciousness, and
the processes or means by which these contents are ‘illuminated,’ cognized, perceived, and so forth by consciousness”
(Pekala, 1991, p. 82). The former is denoted by our use
of the term phenomenal properties. The PCI consists of
12 major dimensions (e.g., positive effect, visual imagery,
rationality) and 14 minor dimensions (e.g., fear, joy,
altered body image). Each dimension is scored on a seven-
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point Likert scale where 0 denotes no or little increased
intensity values and 6 denotes much or complete (Pekala &
Wenger, 1983; Pekala, Wenger, & Levine, 1985). The PCI
possesses adequate psychometric properties. For example,
Pekala, Steinberg, and Kumar (1986) reported coefficient
alphas between .70 and .90 for all dimensions, suggesting
that the PCI has a good internal consistency. In support of
the scale’s criterion validity, Pekala, Steinberg, and Kumar
found that subjects exposed to different stimulus conditions received significantly different PCI scores. One may
use the PCI data to construct graphs referred to as psygrams
that diagram the patterns of relationships between pairs
of phenomenal properties derived from a squared covariance matrix pertaining to a particular stimulus condition
(Pekala, 1991). Previous research has used the PCI to investigate whether, for example, the phenomenology of trance
postures is statistically significantly altered relative to a
baseline stimulus condition of sitting quietly with eyes open
(Woodside, Kumar & Pekala, 1997). Pekala, Wenger, and
Levine (1985) also used sitting quietly with eyes open as
their control condition, arguing that it elicits phenomenal
properties congruent with normal waking consciousness.
7. Clearly, such logic may be extended to other states of
consciousness. For example, the term shamanic states of
consciousness may be replaced by a shamanic pattern of
phenomenal properties, Buddhist states (e.g., jhanas) of
consciousness by a Buddhist pattern of phenomenal properties, yogic states (e.g., samadhi) of consciousness by a
yogic pattern of phenomenal properties, and so on.
8. Similarly, Krippner and Meacham (1968) have suggested
that “it may make more sense to speak of the ‘objects’ of
consciousness than to speak of the ‘states’ of consciousness”
(p. 150). It is noteworthy, however, that this recommendation was not arrived at via a recognition of the consciousness/content fallacy, but rather the methodological difficulties associated with searching for a particular state – or
altered state – of consciousness. For example, Krippner and
Meacham (1968) asserted that:
The concept of “altered states of consciousness” would
be valid if each state brought about similar subjective
reports and similar neurophysiological reactions on the
part of most individuals. With the exception of sleep
and dream states, and with the possible exception of the
“alpha state,” these subjective and objective similarities
have not been consistently noted. (pp. 149-150)
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